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I. INTRODUCTION
The message I wish to convey is relatively simple: first, that an ag-
gressive program of legal reform in Palestine' would contribute strongly
to the successful conclusion of a just, and therefore, durable peace be-
tween Israelis and Palestinians; and second, that such a program of legal
reform should be elevated to a primary concern on the list of interna-
tional and U.S. policy objectives for the region from its currently low
level . Palestinians are far more likely to remain committed to the peace
process when they are convinced that peace has brought tangible benefits
to their lives. After nearly thirty years of strongly repressive Israeli mili-
tary occupation, Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip have a
deep yearning for democratic self-government, and their continued frus-
tration erodes support for the peace process. Moreover, a stable, democ-
ratic Palestinian administration is, in the long run, a more reliable peace
1 Although I join the international consensus in support of the right of the Palestinian
people to national self-determination, I do not use the term "Palestine" to signal such
support. No commonly accepted expression exists that describes the complex of laws and
institutions needing to be reformed. "Palestine" is the term currently used by Palestinians
to describe the entity that is now emerging in the region. I adopt this term without pre-
judgment as to whether this entity will ultimately gain recognition as a state or not. See
generally Omar M. Dajani, Stalled Between Seasons: The International Legal Status of
Palestine During the Interim Period, 26 DEV. J. INT'LL. & POL'Y 27 (1997) (discussing
the national rights of the Palestinian people).
2 As one observer has put it, the challenge of creating a viable legal system in Pales-
tine has been overshadowed by the "high politics" surrounding the Oslo peace process.
See Glenn E. Robinson, The Politics of Legal Reform in Palestine, J. PALESTINE STUD.,
Sept. 22, 1997, available in 1997 WL 10948373.
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partner for Israel than one that is founded on personalistic ties to an ag-
ing, and possibly ailing, leader - Yasser Arafat.3
The impetus for this Article has its roots in my experience within the
last year consulting over the Palestinian Legislative Council's draft law on
the independence of the judiciary, during which time I have met with
elected council members, professional staff of the Council, representatives
of the judiciary and executive branches, academics, and others. Part of my
mission here is simply to bear witness to the hopes and desires of some of
the people on the ground - hard-working, over-burdened, and largely un-
recognized Palestinians who are struggling against daunting odds to provide
their people with an accountable government and a society governed by the
rule of law.
The term "legal reform" is a broad one. Indeed, the scope of reform
needed in Palestine is very broad, encompassing legal institutions, civil
and criminal procedure, and many areas of substantive law. 4 1 will not,
however, address all aspects of the needed reform. Specifically, I will not
discuss the necessity for substantive changes in the areas of corporate
banking and commercial law,5 even though such changes are necessary to
stimulate local and foreign investment, which in turn are needed to coun-
teract unemployment and the general economic deterioration in the Pales-
tinian sector. Other symposium participants will address these topics
with far greater expertise than I would.6 More to the point, however,
there are other areas of legal reform that have a greater capacity to di-
rectly enhance the peace process - namely, those that affect the human
3 There has been much speculation in the press as to the status of Arafat's health.
See, e.g., Arafat's Tremors, JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 20, 1997, at 10; Marjorie Miller,
Arafat's Sickly Appearance Raises Questions About Health, Succession, Mideast: Pales-
tinian Leader's Tremors Add to Concerns About Peace Process with Israel, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 18, 1997, at A6.
4 See generally Hiram E. Chodosh & Stephen A. Mayo, The Palestinian Legal Study:
Consensus and Assessment of the New Palestinian Legal System, 38 HARV. INT'L L.J.
375 (1997) (discussing the status of and proposing reforms to the Palestinian legal sys-
tem).
5 For a discussion of these issues, see generally MAZEN E. QuPTY & JOHN L. HABIB,
LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN PALESTINE (1995).
6 See David P. Fidler, Foreign Private Investment in Palestine Rejected: An Analysis
of the Revised Palestinian Investment Law, 31 CASE W. RES. J. INT'LL. 293 (1999); see
also Keith C. Molkner, Legal and Structural Hurdles to Achieving Political Stability and
Economic Development in the Palestinian Territories, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1419
(1996).
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and civil rights of the Palestinians - and it is these areas on which I
wish to focus.
7
Legal reform is only one of many objectives that can and should be
pursued in support of the peace process, and I do not for a moment imagine
that it, alone, will insure a lasting peace. As the negotiations have proven so
labored and their success is in no way guaranteed, we must exploit every
avenue possible to advance the cause of peace. Moreover, legal reform is
one important area in which progress is politically feasible, a feature that
may distinguish it from other possible policy objectives that, in the abstract,
seem to offer even more attractions.
My argument is laid out in eight sections, of which this introduction
is the first. In the second section, I will outline the legal framework
within which the Palestinian Authority8 - the interim governing body
established for the Palestinians in parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip
- operates. Third, I will identify a set of problems inherited by the Pal-
estinian Authority in the administration of justice in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip, and fourth, I will examine the efforts to address these prob-
lems already undertaken over the last few years. Fifth, I will describe a
series of abuses perpetrated by the Palestinian Authority against the hu-
man and civil rights of the Palestinian residents under its rule. Sixth, I
will analyze the political impact of the Palestinian Authority's abuses of
power within the Palestinian community, particularly as it pertains to the
peace process. Seventh, I will review the record of the U.S. policy and
that of the international community vis-t-vis the development of the rule
of law in Palestine. Eighth, and finally, I will propose a set of specific
policy recommendations that, if implemented, would begin to ameliorate
the problems I have identified, and in so doing, would further the objec-
tive of reaching a just, durable peace between Israelis and Palestinians.
II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Since 1993, Israel and the Palestinians have signed a veritable bliz-
zard of declarations, agreements, letters, annexes, protocols, notes for the
record, and the like, which together total close to 1,000 pages of docu-
ments, including the recent Wye River Memorandum of October 23,
7 Public opinion polls suggest that Palestinian support of the peace process is un-
dermined more significantly by undemocratic practices of the Palestinian Authority than
by the deteriorating economic circumstances. See Khalil Shikaki, Peace Now or Hamas
Later, FOREIGN AFF., July-Aug. 1998, at 29, 38-40.
8 The Palestinians refer to the Palestinian Authority as "As-sulta al-wataniya al-
filastiniya," or the "Palestinian National Authority." See Palestinian National Authority
(visited Jan. 20, 1999) <http://www.pna.org/>.
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1998. 9 It may help us to step back from this maelstrom for a moment and
be reminded of the broad outlines of the current peace process. All of us
remember the dramatic image of Yasser Arafat and the late Yitzhak
Rabin shaking hands on the White House lawn under the approving eye
of President Clinton. In broad contours, the agreement they had reached
consisted of three major components. 10 First, Israel and the Palestinians
exchanged "recognitions" - Israel recognized the Palestinian Liberation
Organization (P.L.O.) as the representative of the Palestinian people, and
the P.L.O. recognized the right of Israel to exist in peace and security."1
Second, the two sides agreed in general terms to a phased withdrawal of
Israeli troops and administrative apparatuses from parts of the West Bank
and Gaza Strip - areas occupied by Israel in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War
and ruled by military government ever since - and to the establishment
in those places of an interim Palestinian self-governing authority. 12 Third,
the parties agreed to continue negotiating the issue of sovereignty over
the territories, as well as the related issues of the status of the city of Je-
rusalem, the rights of Palestinian refugees, the fate of Jewish settlers in
the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and others.1 3 All of these things were to
unfold within a "transitional" period of up to five years, commencing
with the date of the inauguration of the Palestinian self-governing author-
ity. Final status negotiations were to commence no later than the begin-
ning of the third year of the interim period. 14
The first steps to implement the Accord were taken in May 1994,
when Israel and the Palestinians concluded the Agreement on the Gaza
9 See Wye River Memorandum (Interim Agreement), Oct. 23, 1998, Israel-Palestine
Liberation Organization: 37 I.L.M. 1251 [hereinafter Wye River Memorandum].
10 The agreements were solidified as the Declaration of Principles (DOP). See Israel-
Palestine Liberation Organization: Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government
Arrangements, Sept. 13, 1993, 32 LL.M. 1525 [hereinafter Declaration of Principles].
11 This was accomplished in side letters to the Declaration of Principles between
P.L.O. Chairman, Yasser Arafat, and Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin. See Letter
from Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the P.L.O., to Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel
(Sept. 9, 1993) and Letter from Yitzhak Rabin to Yasser Arafat (Sept. 9, 1993), reprinted
in 1992/94 VIII PALESTINE Y.B. OF INT'L L. (Al-Shaybani Soc'y of Int'l L.), at 230-31.
The recognitions are not, of course, fully reciprocal, as the P.L.O. recognized the right of
Israel to exist as a nation while Israel only recognized the P.L.O. as the representative of
the Palestinian people, without acknowledging the latter's rights to national self-
determination.
12 The precise terms of the withdrawal, the structure, and jurisdiction of Palestinian
self-government were left for further negotiations.
13 See Declaration of Principles, supra note 10, at art. V(3).
14 See id. at art. V(2).
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Strip and Jericho Area.15 A "Palestinian Authority" (P.A.) was created
with powers and responsibilities over a range of civil matters delegated
to it by the Israeli military administration,' 6 though none touching on
matters set for discussion in the final status negotiations. One important
fact to underscore here is that the conclusion of this agreement on May 4,
1994, started the clock ticking on the five-year interim or transitional
phase, which will come to an end on May 4, 1999. Shortly thereafter, in
June 1994, Yasser Arafat arrived in Gaza from abroad to head up an in-
terim administration comprised of twenty-four members.
In September 1995, the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the
West Bank and Gaza Strip, 17 often referred to as "Oslo II," was reached,
which extended the jurisdiction of the P.A. into other areas of the West
Bank. The Agreement divided the region into three territorial categories:
A, B, and C. In Area A, composed of the larger urban areas of the West
Bank, and including about four percent of its total land area, the P.A. as-
sumed responsibility for public order and internal security. In Area B,
consisting of West Bank villages, the P.A. took charge of public order
and security for Palestinians, while Israel retained responsibility for secu-
rity in order to protect Israeli nationals and to confront the threat of "ter-
rorism." Areas A and B together contained about sixty-eight percent of
the population of the West Bank and twenty-three percent of its land.
Most of the land was assigned to Area C, where civil authority was
planned to be gradually ceded by the Israeli military government to the
P.A., while Israel maintained complete control over security and order.
Israel further maintained exclusive authority over external security and
foreign affairs.
In accordance with this scheme, Israel began withdrawing its army
from the major towns of the West Bank and, with the sole exception of
the town of Hebron, this first phase of withdrawal was completed by the
15 See Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization: Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the
Jericho Area, May 4, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 622 [hereinafter Agreement on the Gaza Strip and
the Jericho Area].
16 Annex II of the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, entitled a Pro-
tocol Concerning Civil Affairs, contains a list of 38 powers and responsibilities trans-
ferred from the Civil Administration of the Israeli military government to the Palestinian
Authority. See Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, supra note 15, at An-
nex I, art. 1I.
17 See Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization, Interim Agreement on the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip, Sept. 28, 1995, 36 I.L.M. 551 [hereinafter Oslo II].
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end of 1996.18 Three further Israeli troop withdrawals were scheduled to
occur in six-month intervals. 19
Elections for the head?0 of the P.A. and for an eighty-eight seat Leg-
islative Council were then conducted on January 20, 1996.21 In these
elections, Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the
P.L.O., received nearly eighty-eight percent of the popular vote, and fifty
members of his Fatah political party gained seats in the Legislative
Council2.2 Under the Oslo II agreement, the Council, together with the
head of the P.A., exercises both legislative and executive authority.
However, under Article V of the Oslo II agreement, the Council is to ex-
ercise executive powers through a special committee named the "Execu-
tive Authority." This body is composed of the head of the Council, a
number of ministers and department chiefs selected by the head from
among elected members of the Council, and other non-elected persons
from outside the Council whose number may not exceed twenty percent
of the total of the committee.
Beyond this, the relative powers of the executive, legislative, and
judicial branches of the P.A. are minimally spelled out. As events have
unfolded, it has become increasingly clear that the real decision-making
power within the P.A. rests almost solely within the hands of Yasser Ara-
18 See Dilip Hiro, Israel-Palestine: Netanyahu's Untenable Position, Inter Press
Serv., Jan. 16, 1997, available in 1997 WL 7073221. Israel refused to withdraw from
Hebron following a series of suicide bombings in early 1996, perpetrated by Islamist
opponents of the peace process, in which 59 persons were killed. See Pullout from Heb-
ron Not Expected Until After Elections, JERUSALEM POST, May 5, 1996, at 1, available in
1996 WL 4072316. While a subsequent agreement was reached for Israeli withdrawal
from Hebron in January, 1997, Israeli troops remain in the town, ostensibly to guarantee
the security of several hundred Jewish settlers who are ensconced in the middle of the
otherwise exclusively Palestinian Arab town. See Rebecca Trounson & Marjorie Miller,
Netanyahu, Arafat Agree on Long-Stalled Hebron Pull-Out, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1997,
at Al.
19 See Hiro, supra note 18.
20 The term used in the agreement for the leader of the Council is the Arabic "ra'ees,"
which is translated as either "president" or "chairman." See ELIAS A. ELIAS & ED E.
ELIAS, ELIAS' MODERN DICTIONARY ENGLISH-ARABIC 127, 566 (17th ed. 1970).
21 The number of representatives in the Council was originally fixed at 82. See Oslo
II, supra note 17, ch. 1, art. IV. Later the number was increased to 88 by an amendment
to the Palestinian Election Law. See JERUSALEM MEDIA & COMMUNICATION CENTRE, THE
PALESTINIAN COUNCIL 14 (2d ed. 1998).
22 See JERUSALEM MEDIA AND COMMUNICATION CENTRE, supra note 21 (providing a
detailed report of the election results and noting that, of the 35 new members of the
Council formally registered as "independent," many leaned toward Fatah).
2 See Oslo II, supra note 17, ch. 1, art. V.
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Arafat and a small circle of advisors, while the Palestinian Legislative
Council (P.L.C.) has been largely marginalized and rendered ineffec-
tive.24
The latest round of agreements, reached in October 1998, at Wye
River, Maryland, solidified an earlier commitment by Israel to conduct a
further stage of troop withdrawals?2 Israeli forces were to have pulled
back from a further thirteen percent of the West Bank, now part of Area
C. Most of the ceded territory was slated to become part of Area A, under
full P.A. control, which would have then constituted a little over fourteen
percent of the region, while a small area was to have become part of Area
B, under shared Israeli-Palestinian security authority. In return, the Pales-
tinians agreed to take further actions to annul specific clauses of the
P.L.O. charter calling for Israel's destruction and guarantee Israeli secu-
rity.26
Clearly, neither Oslo I nor Oslo II awarded sovereignty over the
West Bank and Gaza Strip to the Palestinians. In fact, both parties to the
Accords undertook not to engage in activities that prejudiced the out-
come of the final status negotiations.27 One might justifiably wonder,
then, where does my call for legal reform fall within this framework?
After all, fundamental changes in the structure of the legal system and
the substantive laws governing community life are quintessentially a
sovereign prerogative. Would Palestinian action in this field run counter
to the spirit, if not the letter of the Oslo Accords? The clear answer is
"no." The original Declaration of Principles contemplated the establish-
ment of "independent Palestinian judicial organs, "2 and provided that the
24 The effect of Arafat's repeated snubs and neglect of the P.L.C. has been to relegate
that body to the role of "a powerless debating club." See The Dilemma Facing Yasser
Arafat, 3 STRATEGIC COMMENTS, 1, 2 (Nov. 1997). For example, after an inquiry in 1997
uncovered widespread corruption and mismanagement among his ministers, President
Arafat stalled for over a year in presenting a new cabinet for P.L.C. approval. Finally, in
August, 1998, President Arafat appeared before the P.L.C., delivered a speech focusing
on the travails of the peace negotiations, and then announced that the entire previous
government would remain in office, supplemented by eight new "state" ministers without
portfolio. See Graham Usher, Arafat's New Cabinet - "Back Me or Sack Me," MIDDLE
E. INT'L, Aug. 21, 1998, at 3.
2 As noted above, this commitment was contained in the Oslo Il agreement at Article
I and timeline attached thereto. The Wye River Memorandum establishes a 12-week
implementation schedule and also commits both parties to negotiate the terms of the
third Israeli troop withdrawal provided for in Oslo II. See Oslo II, supra note 17, ch. 2,
art. X; Wye River Memorandum, supra note 9.
2 See Wye River Memorandum, supra note 9, § I.
27 See Oslo II, supra note 17, at Preamble.
28 Declaration of Principles, supra note 10, art. VII(2).
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Palestinian "Council" would have the power to legislate within its juris-
diction.2 The Agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area further au-
thorized the P.A. "to promulgate legislation, including basic laws, laws,
regulations, and other legislative acts"3 and the Oslo II Interim Agree-
ment specifically assigned the administration of justice through an inde-
pendent judiciary to the P.A.31 There is little doubt, then, that the kind of
legal reform I advocate is, in principle, entirely consistent with the Oslo
Accords and the overall peace process.32
It is also important to point out that, although the precise interna-
tional legal identity of the P.A. may be somewhat indeterminate, as a po-
litical matter, at least, there is little or nothing to prevent the insistence
by outside parties that it abide by international human rights standards
and work to implement the rule of law.3 3 In the first place, such a re-
quirement is written into the Oslo II Agreement, where both parties agree
to "exercise their powers and responsibilities pursuant to this Agreement
with due regard to internationally accepted norms and principles of hu-
man rights and the rule of law."'a Secondly, both the P.L.O. during the
period prior to the Oslo Agreements and the P.A. after these agreements
have unilaterally committed themselves to the observance of interna-
tional human rights principles on a number of occasions and in a variety
of ways. 5 For example, a "Basic Law" passed by the P.L.C. and intended
to serve as an interim constitution for the P.A. contains numerous articles
committing the P.A. to respecting fundamental human and civil rights
29 See id. art. IX.
30 Agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area, supra note 15, art. VII, 1.
31 See Oslo II, supra note 17, ch. 1, art. IX, 6.
3 This is not to say, however, that specific types of legal reform could not violate the
agreements as they currently stand.
33 As the P.A. is not a state, it is ineligible to become a party to international agree-
ments, including those pertaining to human rights. An argument can certainly be made,
however, that the P.A. is nonetheless a subject of international law and may be held ac-
countable at least to abide by customary norms of international law in the area of human
rights. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/MIDDLE EAST, PALESTINIAN SELF-RULE AREAS: Hu-
MAN RIGHTS UNDER THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY 39 (Sept. 1997) [hereinafter
H.R.W./MIDDLE E. REP.]; Eyal Benvenisti, Responsibility for the Protection of Human
Rights Under the Interim Israeli-Palestinian Agreements, 28 ISR. L.REv. 297 (1994).
34 See Oslo II, supra note 17, ch.3, art. XIX. The commitment is reiterated in the Wye
River Memorandum. See Wye River Memorandum, supra note 9, art. II, J 4.
3 The P.L.O. attempted to become a signatory of the Geneva Conventions of 1949
and their additional protocols in 1977, but was rebuffed on account of its non-state
status. See Paul Lewis, P.L.O. Seeks to Sign 4 UN Treaties on War, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9,
1989, at A5.
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both as delineated in various international treaties and in more general
terms. 36 Yasser Arafat, moreover, issued a decree establishing the Pales-
tinian Independent Commission on Citizens' Rights, a quasi-
governmental board charged with monitoring the performance of the P.A.
and ensuring the compliance of public institutions with human rights
principles.37
In sum, then, the legal framework established by the various agree-
ments between Israel and the Palestinians virtually promises legal reform
in the manner I will suggest below.
III. PROBLEMS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN THE WEST
BANK AND GAZA STRIP
The P.A. inherited a staggering array of problems in the administra-
tion of justice in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. For the sake of simplic-
ity, these problems may be summarized as follows: 1) the absence of le-
gal unity between the two regions; 2) confused and antiquated bodies of
substantive and procedural law; 3) weak and vastly under-resourced judi-
ciaries; and 4) a fragmented, demoralized, and poorly trained legal pro-
fession.38 Let us briefly examine each of these challenges.
A. Absence of Legal Unity
Although the two regions historically had shared a common legal
legacy through both the Ottoman Turkish administration and under Brit-
ish mandatory rule, they followed divergent legal trajectories since the
36 See TnE PALESTINIAN BASIC LAW (Third Reading) (1998) (Palestine), translated by
Saladin Al-Jurf [hereinafter BASIC LAW]. The text of the PALESTINIAN BASIC LAW is re-
printed in the Appendix to this issue of the Case Western Reserve Journal of Interna-
tional Law. 31 CASE W. RES. J. INT'LL. 495 (1999). Article 10 of the Basic Law states:
"1) Human rights and basic freedoms are necessary and an obligation of respect. 2) The
Palestinian National Authority works without delay to incorporate international and na-
tional declarations and agreements which protect human rights." Id. art. 10. Other arti-
cles guarantee equality before the law, freedom from arbitrary search or detention, the
right to a public and fair trial, freedom of conscience, and the like. See id. arts. 9, 11, 14,
18.
37 See Decree Number 59 (1993) (in Arabic). The Decree was published in the Offi-
cial Gazette and became effective only in 1995.
3 See generally Chodosh & Mayo, supra note 4 (reviewing problems of legal devel-
opment facing the Palestinian Authority); see generally Frederick Russillo, Preliminary
Judicial Systems Needs Assessment: The Autonomous Areas of Palestine and the Occu-
pied Territories (Nov. 1994) (unpublished manuscript on file with author) (outlining and
proposing solutions that address the current deficiencies in the legal framework and judi-
cial structure of the West Bank and Gaza Strip).
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collapse of the British Mandate in 1948. The West Bank then fell under
Jordanian administration, and following its annexation in 1950, its court
system and substantive laws were gradually assimilated into those of Jor-
dan, which, like most of the Arab World, followed the continental civil
law system. 39 The Gaza Strip, on the other hand, fell under the admini-
stration of the Egyptian military government, yet was never annexed to
Egypt. Instead, its legal system continued to operate relatively free from
Egyptian interference, applying "Palestinian law," which had its roots in
the common law-influenced British mandatory system.40 Thus, the two
systems came to employ different terminology, procedures, and substan-
tive law administered through different institutions.
Why is this a problem? Why is it any more problematic, one might
wonder, than each of the fifty states of the United States having its own
legal system? The answer is that the West Bank and Gaza Strip constitute
a geographically tiny area and are sites of an evolving polity and econ-
omy that face multiple challenges: political, economic, administrative,
and otherwise. Under these circumstances, integration is virtually a con-
dition for survival. It is both costly and unwieldy to maintain two distinct
legal systems and legal disunity hampers the development of commerce
and other aspects of intercommunal life between the two regions.4' Fur-
ther, the absence of an integrated legal system was never the free choice
of distinct communities with regionally distinct identities, but rather the
product of the Palestinians' loss of independence to two different occu-
pying authorities. There is political symbolic value to legal unity as well,
as it re-affirms the "one-ness" of the Palestinian people.
B. Confused and Antiquated Laws
Already subject to multiple layers of law laid down by foreign au-
thorities - Ottoman, British, and Jordanian - both the West Bank and
Gaza Strip were placed under Israeli military administration following
the June 1967, Arab-Israeli war and remained so until the enactment of
the Oslo Accords. What was the fate of the legal systems of the two re-
gions for nearly thirty years under Israeli rule? International law requires
that an occupying power- that is, a state that comes into control of terri-
tory outside its boundaries in a time of war, as Israel did of the West
39 See generally E. Theodore Mogannam, Developments in the Legal System of Jor-
dan, 6 MIDDLE EAST J. 194 (1952) (discussing the post-1950 changes to Jordanian laws
and the Jordanian judicial system).
40 See John Quigley, Judicial Autonomy in Palestine: Problems and Prospects, 21 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 697, 704-05 (1996); see also ADAMA DIENG ET AL., THE CIVILIAN JUDI-
CIAL SYSTEM IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA: PRESENT AND FURURE, 14-15 (1994).
41 See Keeping People in their Place, ECONOMIST, Sept. 12-18, 1998, at 48-53.
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Bank and Gaza Strip - maintain the legal institutions and substantive
law in force on the eve of its occupation. Amendments to existing law are
permitted only for reasons of military necessity or where such changes
are mandated by the interests of the public.42
These principles were at least partially honored by Israel. Thus, the
Gaza Strip and West Bank legal systems (or whatever remnants of them
existed in the regions) resumed operations within one year of the 1967
war. 43 However, no efforts were made to unify their court systems nor to
reconcile their divergent procedural and substantive laws. Legislation
enacted in Jordan following the 1967 war was not enforced in the West
Bank because it was not in force on the eve of the occupation. Thus, the
Israeli military governments established in the West Bank and Gaza Strip
assumed all governing authority there, including powers of legislation. 44
In time, the Israeli military government liberally exercised its legis-
lative authority by enacting over 1,400 legal changes in the form of mili-
tary orders in the West Bank and 1,100 in the Gaza Strip. 45 Many of these
orders dealt with military and security matters, while others seemed pat-
ently targeted to protect Israeli interests and not those of the Palestinian
residents of the region. For example, a series of military orders issued in
the early 1980s forced Palestinian farmers to count and register all fruit
42 Article 43 of the Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land
states:
The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of
the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore and
ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless ab-
solutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.
1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES 629 (James B. Scott ed., 1920).
43 Several important changes occurred in the West Bank court system as a conse-
quence of its separation from Jordan and Israel's annexation of Jerusalem: access to the
Jordanian High Court of Justice in Amman was cut off and judicial power was trans-
ferred by Israeli military order to the West Bank Court of Appeals. The latter court, for-
merly sitting in Jerusalem, was, because of its annexation by Israel in 1967, transferred
to the West Bank city of Ramallah, ten or so miles to the north. See generally GEoRGEE.
BISHARAT, PALESTINIAN LAWYERS AND ISRAELI RULE: LAW AND DISORDER IN THE WEST
BANK, 56-60 (1989) (discussing the interaction between the Israeli military court system
and the existing legal system in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank).
See PROCLAMATION ON LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, (PROCLAMATION No. 2) (Isr.),
reproduced in MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE TERRITORIES ADMINISTERED BY ISRAEL
1967-1980: THE LEGAL ASPECTS, 450-51 (1982).
45 See ADAMA DIENG ET AL., supra note 40, at 39-40.
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trees, tomato plants, and eggplants, and obtain licenses to plant any new
ones - a rather obvious measure designed to protect Israeli agriculture. 46
Meanwhile, a means for assessing the Palestinian community's need
for new legislation was never institutionalized and local Palestinian lead-
ers remained perennially reluctant to seek legislative innovations from an
occupying power whose legitimacy they refused to acknowledge. Thus,
the law remained stagnant in many areas of importance to the Palestini-
ans. The gulf in communication between occupier and occupied was
compounded by the fact that the Israeli military government never con-
sistently publicized its orders, such that the Palestinians, including law-
yers, were at times totally unaware of the laws that governed them.
The resulting situation "cause[d] confusion about governing norms,
prevent[ed] consistent and timely adjudications of civil and criminal
cases, and produce[d] serious gaps between the formal codes and actual
practice. Related to the lack of uniformity, the substantive law [was] not
harmonized sufficiently with emerging international standards of com-
mercial law."'4
46 See BISHARAT, supra note 43, at 136.
47 See RAtA SHEHADEH & JONATHAN KuTTAB, THE WEST BANK AND THE RULE OF
LAW, 43-44 (1980).
43 Institute for the Study and Development of Legal Systems, Palestinian Legal
Study: The Restoration and Modernization of the Palestinian Civil and Criminal Justice
Processes 23 (June 30, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Raja She-
hadeh, a Palestinian lawyer practicing in the West Bank since the late seventies and a
prominent commentator on Palestinian legal affairs, challenges the "commonlyheld mis-
conception" that the existence of multiple layers of law in the West Bank and Gaza Strip
in itself was a source of confusion, as local practitioners always had ways of determining
which among the possible sources of law properly governed particular legal problems.
See RAXA SHEHADEH, FROM OCCUPATION TO INTERIM ACCORDS: ISRAEL AND THE PALES-
TINIANTERRITORIES 74 (1997). It is perhaps more accurate to say that the existence of the
various legal strata caused no confusion as long as there was a consensus within the legal
community on the means for resolving potential conflicts of laws. But the Israeli military
government has, on occasion, exploited ambiguity concerning the ongoing applicability
of certain laws to its own advantage. This was notably true of the Defence Emergency
Regulations, a set of draconian measures enacted by the British during the Mandate pe-
riod to suppress both Palestinian and Zionist paramilitary groups and nationalist activi-
ties. The Israeli military government has maintained that these regulations were never
formally repealed either in the Gaza Strip or West Bank, while Palestinian lawyers, in-
cluding Shehadeh, have argued that they were repealed by implication. The Israeli view
is contained in UzI AMIT-KoHN ET AL., ISRAEL, THE "INTiFADA" AND TE RULE OF LAW
45-48 (David Yahav et al. eds., 1993). The contrary view is argued in RAJA SHEHADEH&
JONATHAN KuTrrTAB, THE WEST BANK AND THE RULE OF LAW 24 (1980), and MARTHA
ROADSTRUM MOFFETr, PERPETUAL EMERGENCY: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF ISRAEL'S USE OF
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C. Weakened Judiciaries
The third problem is weakened and impoverished judiciaries. By all
appearances, the Israeli military government, for its nearly three-decade
stewardship over the court systems in the Occupied Territories, devoted
as few resources as possible to judiciaries without actually forcing their
closure. By the mid-1980s, the courts were already suffering from inade-
quate staffing at all levels, corruption brought on in large part by patheti-
cally inadequate salaries, repeated challenges to their independence from
the Israeli military government, crumbling physical facilities, administra-
tive inefficiencies, and a host of other maladies. 49
Perhaps most importantly, Israel had set up a military legal system
in the Occupied Territories composed of courts and other administrative
tribunals. In time, this system usurped the jurisdiction of the indigenous
courts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in so broad an array of civil mat-
ters as to effectively marginalize them.5° During the Intifada, the Pales-
tinian uprising between 1987 and 1993, the Palestinian police officers
charged with investigating crimes prosecuted in the local courts and exe-
cuting their judgments, resigned en masse, causing the legal systems of
the West Bank and Gaza Strip to all but cease to function.
D. Fragmented Legal Reform
The fourth problem centers upon the fragmented, demoralized, and
professionally enfeebled bar. The problem was most acute in the West
Bank, where leaders of the profession made the fateful decision to boy-
cott the courts upon their re-opening after the 1967 war. The intent of the
strike was to signal the profession's rejection of the legality of the Israeli
THE BRITISH DEFENSE (EMERGENCY) REGULATIONS, 1945, IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
45-47 (1989).
49 See generally BISHARAT, supra note 43, at 125-44 (discussing the general deterio-
ration of the West Bank's formal court system); ADAMA DIENG ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
COMMISSION OF JURISTS & THE CENTRE FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF JUDGES AND LAW-
YERS, THE CIVILIAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA 38-52 (1994) (iden-
tifying main problem areas in the civilian court system in the West Bank and Gaza).
50 Cf. RAJA SHEHADEH, OCCUPIERS' LAW: ISRAEL AND THE WEST BANK 84-91 (1985)
(describing how the power and jurisdiction increased for the military courts and de-
creased for the civil courts).
51 The formal court systems also faced competition from informal mediators whose
judgments were made more quickly and, as a result, were perceived to be more effective
than those made by the courts. See generally Adrien Wing, Legal Decision-Making Dur-
ing the Palestinian Intifada: Embryonic Self-Rule, 18 YALE J. INT'L L. 95, 123-27
(1993).
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occupation and, in particular, its annexation of the city of Jerusalem. Lit-
tle thought was devoted at the time to the possible duration of Israeli rule
but the assumption was that it would be short-term. Eventually, a few
lawyers resumed practice, as did some new graduates of law faculties,
only to be ostracized by the strikers. 52 Thus, the strike, officially called
off only in 1995, 53 not only split and marginalized the profession, but
also deprived it of a generation of wisdom and mentoring, and thereby
led the way for Israeli military officials to exercise the responsibilities
formerly vested in the local bar association. This they did with the same
degree of inattention to community interests as they did other matters.
Circumstances were a little less dire in Gaza. But even there, the in-
flux of many new and poorly trained lawyers to practice greatly weak-
ened the economic status of the profession, and with it the social and po-
litical standing of lawyers. In neither region was there a law faculty of-
fering instruction in local law; aspirants to law practice either studied by
correspondence or by traveling abroad where they received training in
the systems of the host countries. And in both regions the profession was
essentially idled by the closure of the courts during the Intifada.54 Need-
less to say, there was never a bar association that united the legal profes-
sions in the two regions. Together, these factors clearly exacted a toll on
the professional competence of the bar.55
To recount, then, the P.A. inherited a legal system facing challenges
in four key areas: 1) legal disunity; 2) confused and antiquated laws; 3)
weak judiciaries; and 4) an enfeebled legal profession of questionable
competence. Keeping in mind that the various components of a viable
legal system for any state are generally accepted as: 1) independent judi-
ciaries; 2) substantive and procedural laws that are responsive to com-
munity interests; and 3) a professionally competent legal profession, one
can appreciate just how devastating these problems were to the Occupied
Territories.
52 See generally BISHARAT, supra note 43, at 145-61 (examining the disintegration of
the legal profession in the West Bank); George E. Bisharat, Courting Justice? Legitima-
tion in Lawyering Under Israeli Occupation, 20 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 399-402 (1995) (de-
scribing and analyzing the effects of the West Bank lawyers' strike).
53 See RAJA SHEHADEH, FROM OCCUPATION TO INTERIM ACCORDS: ISRAEL AND THE
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES 162 n.7 (Ctr. Of Islamic & Middle E. L. Book Series No. 4,
1997).
54 See Lisa Hajjar, AUTHORITY, RESISTANCE, AND THE LAW: A STUDY OF THE ISRAELI
MILITARY COURT SYSTEM IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, 526 (1995) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, American University) (discussing the migration of lawyers from the civil
courts to the Israeli military courts).
55 See Chodosh & Mayo, supra note 4, at 380, 430-31.
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IV. THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE UNDER THE PALESTINIAN
AuTHoRiTY
What, then, has the P.A. done to deal with the problems we have just
identified? To their credit, Palestinian leaders quickly recognized the
need to revive and unify the moribund legal systems in the two regions,
and there was reason for optimism that genuine, meaningful changes
might be rapidly achieved.56 Most significantly, the P.A. developed, with
assistance from Australia, a detailed plan for improving the administra-
tion of justice in the areas under its control.57 Work also began on estab-
lishing a Basic Law that was intended to serve as an interim constitution
for the P.A.. After considerable public and official debate, a draft law
was passed by the P.L.C. in April 1997.58 Though not a perfect docu-
ment, the Basic Law, if enacted and, more importantly, observed would
greatly advance the rule of law in the region.59 To date, however, it hangs
in limbo, awaiting the signature of Yasser Arafat, who has offered no
public rationale for his failure to ratify the law.60 And as further events
have unfolded, those reasons for early optimism have diminished rather
than increased. Although modest progress has been achieved on some
5 See, e.g., Gary A. Hengstler & Richard L. Fricker, Yasser Arafat: My Vision,
A.B.A. J., Feb. 1994, at 46; Gary A. Hengstler, Building a Rule of Law, A.B.A. J., Feb.
1994, at 50; Gary A. Hengstler, First Steps Toward Justice, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1994, at 52;
Richard L. Fricker & Gary A. Hengstler, From Military Rule to Civil Law, A.B.A. J.,
Feb. 1994, at 62.
57 Specifically, the plan addressed 1) the unification of existing laws governing the
West Bank and Gaza Strip; 2) the improvement of court buildings and facilities; 3) the
unification of judicial systems and procedures; 4) the standardization of prosecution
procedures; 5) the development of computerized legal and judicial databases; and 6) the
development of an independent forensic science capability. See RULE OF LAW STRATEGIC
DEVELOPMENT PLAN (The Palestinian Authority Ministry of Justice ed., 1996) (this pub-
lication was prepared in part by the contributions of Australian International Legal Re-
sources).
58 See Adrien Katherine Wing, The Palestinian Basic Law. Embryonic Constitutional-
ism, 31 CASE W. RES. J. INT'LL. 383 (1999); Palestinian Legislative Council, Laws and
Projects (visited Feb. 24, 1999) <http://www.pal-p.l.c.org/englishllaws/laws.htm>.
59 For a critique of an early draft of the Basic Law, see Naseer Aruri & John Carroll,
A New Palestinian Charter, 23 J. PALESTINE STUD. 5 (1994).
60 Marwan Kanafani, a spokesman for Arafat and P.L.C. member, suggested that
Arafat's refusal to sign the Basic Law is out of concern over the lack of input from dias-
pora Palestinians, whose interests Arafat represents in his capacity as Chairman of the
Executive Committee of the P.L.O. See Larry Kaplow, Arafat Vows Power-Sharing,
Crackdown on Corruption, ATLANTA J./ CONST., Dec. 31, 1997, at A7. According to
Kanafani, "[hie has a problem with (the Council) being part of the Palestinian people but
not all of the Palestinian people." Id.
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fronts, the overall performance of the P.A. exhibits a troubling diffi-
dence, and at times, outright contempt of the law. So let us examine the
P.A.'s record in our four key problem areas.
A. Legal Unification
First, in the area of legal unification, depressingly little has been ac-
complished. Yasser Arafat issued a decree extending the jurisdiction of
the High Court of Justice formerly sitting in Gaza to include the West
Bank; however, it appears not to have been fully implemented.6' Some
steps to establish law commissions - one dealing with the reform and
harmonization of civil procedure and the other doing the same with re-
spect to criminal procedure have been taken - but as of July 1998, nei-
ther commission had been fully staffed nor had become fully opera-
tional.6 New laws applicable to both regions, either in the form of de-
crees issued by Yasser Arafat, or legislation promulgated by the P.L.C.
since 1996, have begun to establish a common corpus of law for the West
Bank and Gaza Strip.63 However, substantial distrust between these legal
communities, each of which tends to push for unification on its own
terms has, no doubt, hampered progress in this important area.'
B. Confusion in Laws
In the second problem area, confused and antiquated substantive and
procedural laws, things have only become increasingly complex and con-
fusing. There are, as I have already mentioned, new sources of legisla-
tion, in the decrees made by Yasser Arafat, and laws passed by the
P.L.C., which add to the multiple strata left by previous administrations.
There is also confusion as to the ongoing applicability of the Israeli mili-
tary orders. On the one hand, the Oslo Accords specifically call for the
continuing application of those orders. On the other hand, one of the very
61 See SHEHADEH, supra note 53, at 152-53 (describing the High Court's extended
jurisdiction). The Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizens' Rights reports that,
as of December 1997, no effort had been made to unify the High Courts in Gaza and the
West Bank. See PALESTINIAN INDEPENDENT COMMISSION FOR CITIZENS' RIGHTS, THIRD
ANNUAL REPoRT,79-80 (1997) [hereinafter PICCR].
62 See Interview with Ibrahim Sha'ban, Member of the Civil Law Commission, Jeru-
salem (July 16, 1998) (notes on file with author).
63 As Raja Shehadeh points out, however, none of the new laws have explicitly iden-
tified the region(s) within which they are to be effective and it is only by inference that
they have been made applicable to both the West Bank and Gaza Strip. See SHEHADEH,
supra note 53, at 152-53.
64 See GLOBAL BUREAU CENTER FOR GOVERNANCE AND DEMOCRACY, JUDICIAL AD-
MINISTRATION PROJECT IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA (Mar. 1996), at 1-3.
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first proclamations of Yasser Arafat following his assumption of powers
was that "the laws, regulations and orders which were in force prior to 5
June 1967 in the West Bank and Gaza Strip shall remain in force until
unified." 65 Note the date - June 5, 1967, the day on which the Arab-
Israeli war started - and it is the laws prior to that date that are to re-
main in effect. The later-issued military orders are therefor presumably
excluded. This decree, widely reported in the region's Arabic press, was
apparently Arafat's attempt to distance himself from the politically un-
popular military orders without patently violating a commitment spelled
out in the Accords. A later decree, however, stated that the laws in force
in the territories as of May 19, 1994, would remain operative - includ-
ing, one must assume, the Israeli military orders issued before that date.
66
It has also become clear since then that the P.A. views some military or-
ders as still in force and has directly cited them as authorizing some of its
actions. 67
In addition, the P.A. has imported laws on criminal procedure that
have no roots in local jurisprudence, but instead were applicable to the
revolutionary courts of the P.L.O. outside the West Bank and Gaza
Strip. s These rather unforgiving rules have been applied in special courts
set up by the P.A. - about which more will follow - without any ena-
bling legislation. 69 Not surprisingly, local legal practitioners have little or
no familiarity with or even access to these laws and are at an obvious
disadvantage in the courts that apply them.70 Thus, the confusion mounts.
6 SHEHADEH, supra note 53, at 149 (quoting text of Decision No. 1 issued on May
20, 1994).
' See id. at 139, 150 (stating that the Israeli government has not stopped issuing mili-
tary orders in the areas still under its control).
67 See, e.g., The Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights and the Envi-
ronment, PNA Carries out Forced Eviction in Jericho Using Israeli Absentee Property
Law (visited Oct. 14, 1997) <http://www.birzeit.edu/lawe/reports/l1994nov94.htnil>. In
one case reported by LAW, the Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights
and the Environment, the P.A. evicted a tenant and his family from a rented home in the
Jericho area via an administrative order through the "Department of Absentee Property,"
an agency established by Israel to administer lands and properties confiscated from Pal-
estinians who were alleged to have been absent from the property during the 1948 war.
See id.
(s See Mona Rishmawi, The Actions of the Palestinian Authority under the
GazalJericho Agreements, in THE PALESTINE NATIONAL AUTHORITY: A CRITICAL AP-
PRAISAL 3, 7 (Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine, 1995).
69 See generally id. at 7-8 (describing the procedures used by the courts and law
enforcement agencies in treating prisoners).
70 See id. at 7.
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One positive accomplishment in this area should be noted. The P.A.
Ministry of Justice contracted with the Bi Zeit University Law Center
to, for the first time, tabulate, gather, and index all the laws in force in
the two regions. This project, now complete, enables judges, lawyers,
legislators, and others to at least undertake their respective obligations
with a better awareness of the laws in force.
71
C. Problems in the Judiciary
Let us now turn to the third challenge, the weak and under-resourced
judiciary, where the courts have faced repeated challenges to their inde-
pendence from the executive branch. First, there has been no clarification
of the rules regarding which body has the authority to select judges and
what procedure governs their appointments. As a matter of practice, this
power has been monopolized by Yasser Arafat, who, in a number of his
appointments, has appeared to reward political loyalty over professional
competence and knowledge of local rules and practice.72 More troubling
still is the fact that several judges have been dismissed or forced into res-
ignation in retaliation for issuing judgments disfavorable to the govern-
ment. This apparently was the case with Chief Justice of the High Court
in the West Bank, Amin Abd al-Salam, who received a resignation order
one week after a High Court ruling ordering the release of a number of
university students illegally detained by the P.A.73 Moreover, Chief Jus-
tice of the Gaza High Court, Qusai al-Abadla, was forced to resign in
early 1998, following the publication of an interview in which he criti-
cized Minister of Justice, Freih Abu Medein,74 for interventions in the
judicial system contrary to law. On a number of occasions as well, P.A.
officials have simply refused to enforce or abide by decisions of the West
Bank and Gaza courts.75
Just as the integrity of the court systems in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip were undermined by Israel's establishment of a parallel military
legal system, so too have they now been undermined by the establish-
71 See Interview with Dr. Camille Mansour, Director of Bir Zeit University Law Cen-
ter, in Bir Zeit, Jordan (July 9, 1998) (notes on file with author).
7-. Thus a former lawyer from Gaza who returned from forced exile was appointed
Chief Justice of Gaza. See Rishmawi, supra note 68, at 7.
73 See H.R.W./MIDDLE E. REP., supra note 33. Abd al-Salam's predecessor in that
position, Khalil Silwani, had earlier suffered a similar fate. See Glenn E. Robinson, Au-
thoritarianism with a Human Face, CURRENT HIST., Jan. 1998, at 13, 16.
74 See Rachelle H.B. Fishman, Palestinian Human Rights Suffer from Official Cor-
ruption, 351 LANCET 425, 425 (1998).
75 See PICCR, supra note 61, at 77-90.
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ment of two new court systems under the P.A. The Security Court system
adjudicates internal and external national security cases according to pro-
cedures elaborated for the P.L.O. revolutionary courts abroad.76 The High
Court for State Security, established in a decree by Yasser Arafat in Feb-
ruary 1995, convenes specially at the behest of the executive authority -
an obvious infringement against the principle of the separation of pow-
ers.
77
The military court system ostensibly tries cases involving members
of the Palestinian security services on matters arising out of the perform-
ance of their duties.78 With the proliferation of security agencies, the
number of persons subject to the jurisdiction of these courts is consider-
able.79 Military court trials follow the same procedures that are required
for the Security Courts. As we shall see below, these procedures are
summary, deficient, and unfair, especially in those cases that have im-
posed the death penalty. 80
The message conveyed by the existence and practices of the security
and military courts is that the regular civil courts are simply not the locus
of real power. Thus, Palestinian citizens often appeal to security person-
nel, rather than the courts, for the resolution of their disputes. Nor has the
message of the powerlessness of the regular civil courts been lost on their
own judges. The High Court, ostensibly the highest legal authority in the
land, has several times declined to hear cases involving illegal detentions
ordered by military courts, on the grounds that it lacks the jurisdiction to
do so.8 '
On the bright side, the P.L.C. passed a Law on the Independence of
the Judiciary in late November 1998, which was subsequently given to
Yasser Arafat for ratification. This law is of paramount significance
given its potential to greatly strengthen the judicial branch of govern-
ment. In its current form, however, the law continues to suffer from nu-
merous deficiencies, and I am pessimistic as to whether the law will even
be ratified, let alone exert the positive influence over the judiciary that it
76 The Security Courts consist of a Misdemeanor State Security Court, a General
State Security Court, and High Court for State Security. See id. at 81-82.
' See id.
78 See id. at 83.
79 See Debrah Horan, Palestinian Police Preside Without Law, Hous. CHRON., June
22, 1997, at 1.
80 See PICCR, supra note 61, at 82.
81 See, e.g., Amnesty International, Palestinian Authority: Prolonged Political Deten-
tion, Torture, and Unfair Trials (visited Feb. 5, 1999) <http://www.amnesty.org.ukl
reports/palestine/index.html>.
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set out to establish.' Despite this pessimism, enactment of the law on the
Independence of the Judiciary will figure prominently on my list of pol-
icy recommendations.
D. The Legal Profession
Lastly, let us turn to the status of the legal profession. Here, at least,
we can say that some real progress has been made. Negotiations between
the various organizations representing lawyers in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip resulted in an agreement for the establishment of a founding
committee for a new Palestinian Bar Association, encompassing both
regions, in June 1997. Shortly thereafter, a decree by Yasser Arafat be-
stowed on this committee the powers of a bar association.8 3 From these
measures, the legal profession has at least the beginnings of an organiza-
tion that can articulate the concerns of lawyers, assure the competence of
new entrants to the bar, enforce discipline within the profession, and per-
form other similar responsibilities. In addition, legal education tailored
more to local practice is now available in several local universities.8 4 No
doubt the benefits of these developments will become more readily ap-
parent as time goes on.
Overall, however, the progress of the P.A. toward overcoming the
problems in the legal system has been disappointing. Perhaps this as-
sessment of the performance of a fledgling government facing challenges
at nearly every level seems overly harsh and critical. The consequences,
however, may be read in the P.A.'s rather dismal record in the area of
respect for Palestinian human and civil rights. It is to that record that I
now turn.
8 The law had not yet been signed by the head of the P.A. - a condition for its
enactment - as of February 15, 1999, nor was there any indication that a signature
was forthcoming. Telephone Interview with Keith Schultz, Associates in Rural De-
velopment, in Ramallah, Jordan (Feb. 15, 1999).
83 See The State of Human Rights in Palestine II: the Judicial System, PALESTINIAN
HUM. RTs. MONITOR, Aug. 1997, at 17; PICCR, supra note 61, at 79.
8 Bir Zeit University Law Center has established a Masters in Law program geared
to educate graduates of foreign law schools in local law. See Interview with Dr. Camille
Mansour, supra note 71. Jerusalem University now offers a four-year undergraduate
program in law, which leads to a "license" degree authorizing its holders to enter local
professional practice. See Interview with Ali Khashan, Faculty of Law Dean at Jerusalem
University, in Jerusalem (July 16, 1998) (notes on file with author).
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V. ABUSES OF HUMAN AND CiVIL RIGHTS UNDER THE PALESTINIAN
AuTHoRiTY
Let me first clarify the relationship between the problems in the le-
gal system outlined in the prior two sections and the abuses of human
and civil rights I am about to describe. It is not the case that the problems
in the legal system simply cause the human rights abuses. Indeed, both
the problems and the abuses may themselves share roots in deeper causes
related to external pressures on the P.A., internal political challenges
faced by its leadership, and the nature of the Palestinian political cul-
ture."
The external pressures emanate from Israel and the United States in
the form of repeated demands that the P.A. crack down on "terrorism" as
a price for further Israeli military withdrawals from the Occupied Terri-
tories. As I go through this litany of abuses, keep in mind that U.S. offi-
cials have been fully cognizant of them and have acquiesced and even
encouraged their commission. The internal challenges involve maintain-
ing the legitimacy of the peace process and the political leadership that
has pinned its fate to the success of that process and holding off the
Islamist and leftist nationalist opposition to the Oslo Accords. These de-
mands fall on a leadership accustomed to working within the framework
of a revolutionary movement only minimally constrained by law.
Even so, deficiencies in the legal system encourage the abuses,
while improvements in the legal system will undoubtedly foster, though
not independently cause, advancements in the P.A.'s respect for human
and civil rights.
One other important clarification the security services, under the di-
rection of the executive branch, is primarily responsible for most of the
rights violations. The executive branch consists of the P.A. head, Yasser
Arafat, his selected ministers, and other department chiefs. The P.L.C., in
contrast, is now the most important forum for airing the dismay of the
Palestinian community over abuses by the executive authority of citi-
zens' rights. However, its many resolutions and recommendations to the
executive branch regarding human and civil rights violations have been
consistently ignored, reflecting, in part, the absence of a constitution or
other legal referent that clearly defines the relative powers of the
branches of government in the P.A.86 Thus, as I detail the record of
abuses under the "P.A.," I am primarily referring to its executive branch.
85 See generally Glenn E. Robinson, Authoritarianism With a Palestinian Face, CUR-
RENT HIST., Jan. 1998, at 13 (discussing the causes of the P.A.'s authoritarian politics).
86 See PICCR, Third Annual Report, supra note 61, at 55-58.
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The record of human rights abuses highlights the following four ar-
eas: 1) illegal and arbitrary arrests and detentions; 2) torture and physical
abuse of detainees; 3) unfair trials; and 4) violations of the freedom of
press and public expression.
A. Illegal Arrests and Detentions
Arbitrary arrests without reference to the law are perhaps the most
widespread of violations against human rights by the P.A. There are, of
course, laws of criminal procedure in force in both the Gaza Strip and the
West Bank that regulate seizures of persons. 87 While wanting in some
important respects, these laws nonetheless impose either warrant re-
quirements or, in exigent circumstances justifying warrantless arrests,
post-arrest review of one form or another. 8 The laws also establish stan-
dards and procedures for review of pre-trial detention and provide for
attorney and family visitation.
The P.A. has frequently engaged in wide-ranging sweeps, generally
in the aftermath of an act of violence against Israelis by Islamist oppo-
nents of the peace process, in which hundreds, if not more, have been
arrested without warrant, often on the basis of political beliefs and
affiliations rather than any grounded suspicion of actual criminal
responsibility. For example, following several suicide bombings in Israel
in 1996, the P.A. arrested almost 1,100 suspected sympathizers of
Hamas89 and Islamic Jihad and detained them for periods far in excess of
the law. 9° The Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group in 1997
87 For an overview of criminal procedure in Gaza and the West Bank, see Palestinian
Legal Study, supra note 48.
88 Gaza law requires post-arrest review within 48 hours by magistrate; Jordan vests
power of review in prosecutor. See id. at Attachment E at 1, Attachment F at 3.
89 "Hamas" in Arabic means "zeal" and is the acronym of "harakat al-muqawima al-
islamiya," or "Islamic Resistance Movement." See ZIAD ABu-AMR, ISLAMIC FUNDAMEN-
TALISM IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA: MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND ISLAMIC JIHAD 66
(1994). Hamas was founded in Gaza before the Intifada, while Islamic Jihad was
founded during it, both with the goal of ending Israeli occupation and establishing an
Islamic state in Palestine. See id. at 53, 66, 93, 103. Hamas is composed of a non-
military, administrative, charitable, and political wing, and a military wing which has
launched a series of deadly attacks against Israeli soldiers and civilians. See id. at 67;
AHMAD RASHAD, HAMAS: PALESTINIAN POLITICS WITH AN ISLAMIC HuE 7 (1993). Islamic
Jihad is a purely politico-military organization which is also responsible for multiple
lethal attacks against Israelis. Cf id. at 4-5; ABU-AMR, supra at 106-08.
90 See Human Rights Under the Palestinian Authority: Hearing Before the Subcom-
mittee On International Operations and Human Rights of the Committee on International
Relations, 104th Cong. 77 (1996) (statement of Abigail Abrash, Director, Robert F. Ken-
nedy Memorial Center for Human Rights) [hereinafter Abrash Hearing].
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The Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group in 1997 documented
117 cases in which individuals were detained without charge and without
trial for more than a year;91 and in some cases, detention has lasted for
more than two years.9- In August of that same year, another Palestinian
human rights group estimated the number of persons detained without
charge or trial at between 200 and 300.93 Many have been held
incommunicado for lengthy periods as well.
No doubt a condition contributing to this particular kind of violation
is the proliferation of security services under the P.A. As of 1997, at least
twelve military branches have been operating in the region, employing as• • 94
many as 30,000 to 50,000 individuals. The problem is not only, or even
chiefly, one of numbers. Few members of the security forces are profes-
sionally trained police officers. Most members are either former P.L.O.
fighters who came to the regions with the P.L.O. leadership in 1994, or
young Intifada activists, many formerly imprisoned by the Israelis, who
were awarded appointments in return for service to the nationalist cause
and, one may surmise, ongoing political loyalty to Arafat.95 The duties
and terms of reference of these many agencies are nowhere specified.
According to Human Rights Watch, "[t]he various security agencies ap-
pear to be autonomous units whose duties are ill-defined and overlap-
ping. They appear to be accountable to no one but President Arafat, and
sometimes act in competition with one another. 9 6 Courts, moreover,
have proven nearly powerless to halt these illegal and arbitrary arrests.
B. Torture and Abuse of Detainees
The character of the security agencies also plays a role in the second
even more disturbing category of human rights violations committed un-
der the P.A., namely torture and abuse of detainees. The first death of a
detainee in the custody of the P.A. was that of Farid Abu Jarbu'a in July,
91 See PALESTINIAN HUMAN RIGHTS MONITOR, supra note 82, at 7-8.
92 See Avi Machlis, Israel: Demands Foster Palestinian Police State, FIN. TIMES
(LONDON), Oct. 21, 1998, Int'l at 5, available in LEXIS Market Library, Promt File.
93 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUM. RTS. WATCH WORLD REP. 1998, at 340 (1998)
[hereinafter H.R.W. WORLD REP. 1998].
94 See Horan, supra note 79. One of the salutary provisions of the Wye River agree-
ment is the planned reduction of this number to no more than 30,000; even that number
is large in light of the size of the population of the region.
95 See generally GRAHAM USHER, PALESTINE IN CRISIS: THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE
AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE AFTER OSLO, 65-67 (1995).
96 H.R.W./MIDDLE E. REP., supra note 33, at 9.
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1994, shortly after the P.A. came to power in the Gaza-Jericho areas.97
An autopsy revealed traces of violence on his body, later announced by
the Palestinian Justice Minister to have been the cause of death.98 By the
end of 1997, an additional fourteen Palestinians had died in P.A. custody
under questionable circumstances. 99 Some certainly died of pre-existing
health conditions, but in 1996 and 1997 at least fourteen deaths were
confirmed to have been directly caused by torture. 1°° Numerous reports
of physical abuse at less than lethal levels have led Palestinian human
rights workers to conclude "[tiorture is a routine and everyday reality in
the Autonomous Areas .... 1o1
The forms of torture employed by Palestinian security officials in-
lude beatings both with and without weapons, positional abuse, hood-
ing, exposure to extremes of heat and cold, sleep deprivation, burning
with electric elements, cigarettes, or molten plastic, and threats and in-
sults.1 2 Detainees are often subjected to more than one of these forms of
abuse. Some methods, for example, positional abuse, which often in-
volves shackling the person to a child-sized chair in a painfully contorted
position for periods of many hours, mimic techniques used by Israeli in-
terrogators against Palestinian detainees and may have been learned by
Palestinian security officers who had previously been tortured them-
selves. 10
3
As one can imagine, the practice of torture has not gone unremarked
within or outside of the Palestinian community. Palestinian official re-
sponse to the outcry has generally been to deny the widespread torture of
detainees, while admitting its occurrence in isolated examples and, even
97 See id. at 18.
9' See id.
99 See id.
100 See SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS & HOUSE COMM. ON INT'L RELATIONS,
105TH CONG., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1997, 1481 (Joint
Comm. Print 1997) [hereinafter COUNTRY REPORTS 1997].
101 The State of Human Rights in Palestine III, PALESTINIAN HUM. RTS. MONITOR,
Dec. 1997, at 4.
102 See Amnesty International, supra note 81, ch. 6; U.S. Dep't State, Israel and the
Occupied Territories Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1997 (Jan. 30, 1998)
<http://www.state.gov/www/global/humanjrights/1997_hrpreportIsrael.html>(de-
scribing position torture used on Ahma Abu Hamed).
103 See Amnesty International, supra note 81. On Israeli torture techniques, see HU-
MAN RIGHTS WATCH/MIDDLE EAST, TORTURE AND ILL-TREATMENT: ISRAEL'S INTERRO-
GATION OF PALESTINIANS FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES (1994).
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less frequently, investigating and bringing to justice its perpetrators. 104
Yet the manner of those investigations and trials: hasty, summary, and
rife with procedural inadequacies,105 suggests a lack of will to systemati-
cally root out the causes of official torture and instead a desire to appease
critics with "show" trials and public scapegoats.
Earlier I alluded to unfair trials, especially those conducted in either
the Security Courts or in the military courts. Let me now spell out some
of the procedural deficiencies of these courts. Between the first trial in
the Security Courts in April 1995 and February 1997, some fifty-seven
additional cases were tried. According to Human Rights Watch:
Trials have usually been held at night, within hours of arrest, and have
often lasted only minutes. Defendants have been systematically denied
the right to be represented by independent counsel, bring witnesses, or
appeal their verdicts. The judges presiding over these courts are mili-
tary commanders who reportedly have no judicial experience, having
served in neither the ordinary criminal nor the military courts.'06
Although P.A. officials announced that these trials would be held in
public, authorities have typically given no advance notice of the trials
and suspects themselves have only learned of their impending trial upon
their entering the courtroom. 10 7 Families of defendants have typically not
been notified prior to trial, and some have learned of their loved one's
convictions by radio announcement after the fact. 10 8
The shortcomings of a Security Court trial are mirrored in the pro-
ceedings of the military courts. Punishments meted out by both types of
courts have not been trivial. Both, in fact, are empowered to enforce the
death penalty, and a number of death sentences have been handed down
between the two court systems. 109 None had been carried out until August
1998, when two members of a Palestinian security service tried in mili-
tary court for murder and assault against other Palestinians were executed
104 See Deaths in Detention: A Pattern of Abuse, Illegality, and Impunity, PALESTINIAN
HUM. RTS. MONITOR, Dec. 1997.
105 H.R.W./MIDDLE E. REP., supra note 33, at 14-15.
106 Id.
107 See Amnesty International, supra note 81.
"o' See id.
109 See, e.g., Rebecca Trounson, Palestinian Brothers Executed 4 Days After Crime,
L.A. TIMES. Aug. 31, 1998, at A6.
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by firing squad within four days of the alleged offense." ° Other sen-
tences that included many years of hard labor have also been imposed."'
D. Muzzling Freedom of Expression
Let us now turn to the fourth and last major category of human
rights violations, limitations on the freedom of the press and public ex-
pression. The P.A. has repeatedly shown a deplorable readiness to stifle
public opposition to the peace process or criticism of its performance.1 12
It has done so through either temporary or permanent closures of news-
papers, interference with their distribution, and harassment and arrest of
journalists, human rights workers, and other critics of the government.113
This is so, notwithstanding provisions of the Palestinian Press Law
passed by the P.L.C., guaranteeing freedom of expression." 4
Interference with the distribution of newspapers or their closure was
particularly endemic in the first two years of P.A. rule. In May 1995, the
East Jerusalem newspaper al-Umma ran a caricature of Yasser Arafat,
earning it a warning from the Preventive Security Service (P.S.S.) (per-
haps the largest of the Palestinian security agencies) against issuing that
edition.1 5 Although most of the copies were seized by the P.S.S., some
had already been released. The paper then published a statement outlin-
ing and criticizing the behavior of the P.S.S.116 Shortly thereafter, arson
damaged the offices of al-Umma and its owner, who reportedly had also
been threatened, subsequently shut down the paper.1 7 Further, the largest
Palestinian daily in the area, al-Quds, suffered a one-week shut-down
"o See id.
II Amnesty International, for example, reports that two Palestinian naval policemen
were sentenced to 15 and 10 years imprisonment with hard labor for causing an uninten-
tional death. Their trial, including a half-hour recess, was concluded within two hours.
See Amnesty International, supra note 81.
112 See H.R.W./MIDDLEE. REP., supra note 33, at 23, 28-30.
13 See id. at 24-35.
114 Although the Press Law also contains vague provisions barring the publication of
articles that "may cause harm to national unity," it authorizes the confiscation of such
articles. H.R.W./MIDDLE E. REP., supra note 33, at 24 (quoting Article 37(3) of the 1962
Basic Law of the Gaza Strip). For a thorough analysis of the impact of the Press Law on
freedom of expression, see PALESTINIAN CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, CRITIQUE OF THE
PRESS LAw OF 1995 ISSUED BY THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY (1995).
115 See H.R.W./MIDDLE E. REP., supra note 33, at 24.
116 See id.
117 See id.
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after publishing a paid announcement by Hamas and interviewing a
prominent Palestinian critic of the peace process.
18
Harassment and detentions of journalists were also common during
this period. In one of the best-publicized of these incidents, the editor of
al-Quds received a call on Christmas Eve, 1995, instructing him to move
an article describing a meeting between Yasser Arafat and the Greek Or-
thodox Patriarch from page eight in the paper to the front page. 119 Fol-
lowing his refusal, the Preventive Security Service personnel detained
him for five days.' 20 Many other journalists, up to twenty-five in the first
two years,' 2 ' suffered detentions, while others had been beaten, threat-
ened, and insulted at scenes they had attempted to report, and had equip-
ment, notes, and personal belongings destroyed or confiscated by secu-
rity personnel.122
Such assaults on the freedom of the press have been less common
recently, though they have not stopped completely. In late October, 1998,
eleven journalists were briefly detained and their notes and videotapes
seized, while they attempted to interview Sheikh Ahmad Yassin on the
Islamist reaction to the agreement reached at Wye River. 12 Following the
Wye River meetings and in a misguided effort to carry out the terms of
the Memorandum, Yasser Arafat issued an "anti-incitement" decree that
would punish not only incitement to racial discrimination and violence,
but also incitement "to division" or "to breaching the agreement" reached
between the P.L.O. and other states - in short, virtually any criticism of
the policies and actions of the Authority. 24 The effect of all of this has
been, predictably, self-censorship on the part of the Palestinian press. In
the words of one prominent Palestinian journalist, Ghassan al-Khatib:
1 See id. at 24-25.
"1 See id. at 25.
120 See H.R.W./MIDDLE EAST REPORT, supra note 33, at 25.
121 See id.
12 See The State of Human Rights in Palestine IV, PALESTINIAN HUM. RTS. MONITOR,
Jan. 1998, at 17-21.
123 During the Negotiations of the Israeli/Palestinian Peace and Security Agreement at
Wye Plantation, the Palestinian Police Arrests Journalists and Prevents Them from Con-
tacting the Political Opposition and Confiscates their Films and Tapes, Palestinian
Hum.Rts Monitoring Group, Press Release, Oct. 24, 1998 (on file with author).
124 See Wye: A Charter for Human Rights Violations (visited Feb. 3, 1999)
<http://www.lawsociety.org/press/ 1998/oct_26.html> (containing severe criticisms of the
Wye negotiations and agreement published by LAW in an October 26, 1998 press re-
lease).
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The problem is that there is no respect for the law and because the judi-
cial system is weak, there is nobody strong enough to challenge these
acts. Therefore newspapers are afraid to write anything that might an-
noy the P.A. Instead, they count on WAFA, the official Palestinian
news agency, for what they know is okay to print. 5
Lawyers and human rights workers who have spoken critically of
P.A. practices have also been targeted. By far the best-publicized of these
cases is that of Dr. Eyad Sarraj, a medical doctor and former commis-
sioner-general of the Palestinian Independent Commission on Citizens'
Rights. 26 He was initially detained in December 1995, for allegedly "de-
faming" the P.A. 127 He was again arrested in May 1996, for "allegedly
slandering the P.A.," after having described it as "corrupt, dictatorial,
[and] oppressive" in a New York Times editorial. 2s During this incident,
he was detained for eight days. 129 He was released on bail, yet had never
formally been charged.' 3°
On June 10, 1996, Sarraj was re-arrested and charged with posses-
sion of hashish in his clinic office.13 1 Several days later, Sarraj was
brought before a State Security Court which extended his detention on
the charge that he had assaulted a policeman while in custody.'32 After
seventeen days in custody, Sarraj was released on bail after signing a
document committing him to "abide by the law when it comes to publish-
ing anything to do with the authorities.' 33 However, the trumped-up
drug charges were never officially dismissed. 134 Variations on this ex-
perience have been endured by a number of other human rights workers
and lawyers in the region. 35
125 H.R.W./MIDDLE E. REP., supra note 33, at 26.
'2 See id. at 32.
127 See id.
12' Anthony Lewis, Darkness in Gaza, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1996, at A15.
'29 See H.R.W./MIDDLE E. REP., supra note 33, at 32-33.
0 See id. at 33.
131 See id.
'3 See id.
133 Id. (quoting Eyad Sarraj, Justice in Heavens, open statement following his third
release from prison, on July 15, 1996).
134 See H.R.W./MIDDLE E. REP., supra note 33, at 33.
135 Others detained include Raji Sourani, director of the Gaza Center for Rights and
Law; Bassam Eid, a researcher for the Israeli human rights organization B'Tselem; and
Muhammad Dahman, an activist in ad-Dameer (a prisoner support organization). See id.
at 31-35.
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This is only a partial list of the abuses against human and civil rights
perpetrated by the P.A. To be sure, they pale by comparison to the range
and scale of abuses suffered by Palestinians under Israeli military gov-
ernment in its heyday. For example, the P.A. has never engaged in puni-
tive home demolitions, 136 deliberate campaigns of politically motiviated
killings,' 37 forced exile, 138 and land confiscations. 3'According to Israeli
military sources, 83,321 Palestinians were brought to trial in military
courts during the Intifada, 140 and more than 18,000 administrative deten-
tion orders were issued from the beginning of the uprising to November,
1997.141 Even in the post-Oslo period, substantial numbers of Palestini-
ans continue to be held in Israeli prisons. 142 In May 1998, the Israeli hu-
man rights group B'Tselem made claims that Israeli intelligence services
detain and interrogate some 1,000 to 1,500 Palestinians per year and that
an estimated eighty-five percent are tortured. 143
Still, one may ask, "How have the Palestinians put up with all of
this? Why haven't they engaged in open revolt against the P.A.?" They
may yet, in fact, and that is precisely the danger that neglect of these
136 See generally Dan Simon, The Demolition of Homes in the Israeli Occupied Terri-
tories, 19 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (1994) (providing a critical legal analysis of the Israeli
home demolition policy).
137 See Elia Zureik & Anita Vitullo, Extrajudicial Killings: Israel's Latest War on the
Intifada 20 (1992) (unpublished manuscript on file with author) (providing evidence of
Israel's reliance on political killings and summary executions).
138 See B'TSELEM, 1987-1997 A DECADE OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 26 (Jan.
1998).
139 See generally George Bisharat, Land, Law, and Legitimacy in Israel and the Occu-
pied Territories, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 467 (1994) (arguing, in part, that Israeli has ex-
pended a great deal of energy to construct a legal regime facilitative of land confisca-
tions).
140 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/MIDDLE EAST, TORTURE AND ILL-TREATMENT: IS-
RAEL'S INTERROGATION OF PALESTINIANS FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 2 (1994).
141 See B'TSELEM, supra note 138, at 18.
1Q At the end of 1997, the U.S. State Department reported that 3,565 Palestinians
were imprisoned by Israel, of whom 382 were under administrative detention. See
COUNTRY REPORTS 1997, supra note 100, at 1465.
143 See Press Release from B'Tselem and ACRI, in Joint Report to the U.N. Commit-
tee Against Torture: Israel Continues to Violate Convention Against Torture, (May 14,
1998) (visited Mar. 1, 1999) <http://www.btselem.org/PRESS/980514.htm>. Other forms
of repression continue as well. See generally B'TSELEM, DEMOLISHING PEACE: ISRAEL'S
POLICY OF MASS DEMOLITION OF PALESTINIAN HOUSES IN THE WEST BANK (Sept. 1997)
(describing Israel's policy of mass demolition carried out on Palestinian homes built
without effectively available building permits).
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abuses entails. So let us now turn to look at the political impact of these
violations of Palestinians' human and civil rights, and, in particular,
weigh their implications for the progress of the peace negotiations.
VI. THE POLTIcAL IMPACT OF HUMAN AND CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
The first thing to keep in mind in gauging the political impact of the
P.A.'s human and civil rights violations is the broader historical context.
Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza Strip suffered many years under
a highly repressive Israeli military government. At the same time, occu-
pation brought the Palestinians into unprecedented proximity with Israeli
society and government and thus, introduced them to a working democ-
racy. While never under illusions about the fruits of this democracy for
themselves, or even for their Arab relatives living within Israel and suf-
fering discrimination there, 144 Palestinians in the Occupied Territories
were, nonetheless, able to witness parliamentary elections and debates, a
highly critical and relatively free press, open public debate and assembly,
and an authentic, healthy court system.
Though the Israeli military government in the Occupied Territories
was repressive, it was also in many respects a highly legalistic admini-
stration.' 45 This allowed at least limited scope for legal opposition to
military government practices, and, by the mid-eighties, a number of Pal-
estinian human rights groups had cropped up which were schooled in the
language and organizing tactics of the international human rights move-
ment and protected somewhat from Israeli retribution by ties to that
movement. 46 In other fields such as labor and womens' movements,
health, agriculture, and education a number of non-governmental organi-
zations (NGOs) were developed to address the human and social needs of
the Palestinian people that were not being addressed by the Israeli mili-
tary government.1' These NGOs were decentralized in leadership and
stressed institutionalized internal governance rather than personalized
144 See generally DAVID KRETZMER, THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE ARABS IN ISRAEL, 77-
134, 175-79 (1990) (discussing overt, covert, and institutional discrimination against
Arabs in Israel).
145 See BISHARAT, supra note 43, at 47-69 (discussing the dual character of the Israeli
miltary government).
146 See generally George Bisharat, Attorneys for the People, Attorneys for the Land:
The Emergence of Cause Lawyering in the Israeli-Occupied Territories, in CAUSE
LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES, 453, 463-
67 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998).
147 See generally GLENN E. ROBINSON, BUILDING A PALESTINIAN STATE: THE INCOM-
PLETE REVOLUTION 38-65, 184 (1997) (describing the rise of these organizations and the
management of these organizations by the PNA).
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politics. In sum, then, a dynamic Palestinian civil society had emerged
that had an image of what a democracy, albeit a flawed one, was all
about, one which had some modest experience with democratic practices
and high aspirations, if not expectations, of democratic self-government
under the incoming Palestinian administration.
The Palestinian political spectrum today is broadly composed of
three main forces: 1) a mainstream nationalist center, led by Yasser
Arafat's Fatah; 2) a leftist nationalist opposition, including the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Democratic Front for the
Liberation of Palestine; and 3) the Islamist opposition, associated with
Hamas and Islamic Jihad.148 While the relative weight of these three
forces in the West Bank and Gaza Strip has varied over the last several
years, largely in response to ebbs and flows in the peace negotiations, the
mainstream center, with the establishment of a Palestinian state through
the Oslo peace process the centerpiece of its agenda, has maintained pre-
eminence. Support by the Palestinian public for the peace process has
proven remarkably durable, and there has even been a Palestinian con-
stituency in support of P.A. repression for those who have attempted to
derail the peace process through dramatic acts of violence.
However, the undemocratic practices of the P.A. have disappointed
the Palestinians and undermined their enthusiasm for the peace process.
How could it not be so? This is a community, after all, that had honed its
knowledge of human rights principles and advocacy skills under Israeli
occupation, conducted grass-roots organizing and international publicity
campaigns against Israeli torture of Palestinians, and had criticized the
injustices rampant in Israeli military courts. What pain and humiliation
Palestinians must feel, to now be subjected to the exact same abuses,
even down to the details of the torture techniques, at the hands of their
own government. A combination of disbelief and deep despair were pal-
pable in the voice of one Palestinian human rights lawyer to whom I
spoke last July. He told me:
You know, under the Israelis, when a client's family approached me, I
would at least know where to go to find out his whereabouts. Now,
with all of these different security services, I can't even begin my rep-
resentation - I have no idea even where to start, who to ask, what
prison to go to find my client. It is very, very bad - worse than it has
ever been."4
148 See Shikaki, supra note 7, at 30-32.
149 Interview with Mazen Qupty, Mazen Qupty & Associates, in Jerusalem (July 14,
1998).
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As emotionally telling as this comment is on one level, it is factually
inaccurate. To repeat: neither the range nor the scale of P.A. abuses of
human and civil rights approaches that of the Israeli occupation authori-
ties. That matters are perceived otherwise by my human rights lawyer
friend, however, tells you something about the deep psychological hurt
P.A. practices inflict - mocking as they do the high hopes for an
accountable, democratic regime that Palestinians of the West Bank and
Gaza Strip had developed.
If support for the peace process has been surprisingly constant, even
in the face of this catalogue of abuses by the P.A., it would be a grave
mistake to assume that it will necessarily continue. This is because the
support has been contingent on two key factors: 1) the sense that the
peace process is actually moving forward, even if incrementally, and has
not become totally stalled - in other words, that the "end" justifying the
otherwise objectionable "means" is ultimately not lost; and 2) the ongo-
ing leadership of Yasser Arafat. In the words of Palestinian political sci-
entist Khalil Shikaki:
The key to continued Palestinian support for Oslo is Arafat himself. If
he were to leave the scene, the pro-peace camp would be in grave trou-
ble. Indeed, the main constituency for peace comes from Arafat's Fatah
movement, [which] defers to his leadership, and sees him as the unchal-
lenged leader of Palestinian nationalism. Arafat remains the most po-
tent symbol of the Palestinian revolution.'50
The peace process was momentarily resuscitated with the agreement
reached at Wye River, but has stalled yet again with the Israeli cabinet's
vote to suspend implementation of the agreement. Far more intractable,
final status issues loom ahead. How long Yasser Arafat survives - he is
widely reported to be in ill-health - is anyone's guess. It thus seems
evident that institutionalizing the Palestinian leadership and investing the
broadest segment of the Palestinian population as is possible with sub-
stantial interests in the negotiations, is a necessity for the survival of the
peace process. We can ill afford to have the Palestinians wake up some
day and find that, with their economy shot and their leadership corrupt
and repressive, they have gained absolutely nothing from peace, and
therefore, have absolutely nothing to lose in resorting to violence. It is
for just that reason that U.S. policy responses to this situation, and so,
too, those of other nations have thus far been so disappointing. Let us
now turn to those responses.
150 See Shikaki, supra note 7, at 41.
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VII. U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY RESPONSES
In fairness, the United States, the European Union, and other inter-
national organizations or nations have not been totally neglectful of the
problems discussed herein. In fact, an impressive number of groups and
countries have offered technical assistance of a wide variety to what
might be called "rule of law development" under the P.A. As of July,
1997, some seventeen donors and ten United Nations agencies and pro-
grams supported legal development in the West Bank and Gaza Strip
with a total committed budget of about $72 million. 151 U.S. support has
been mostly channeled through U.S. aid to a number of non-profit devel-
opment organizations which have sponsored programs for judicial train-
ing, technical assistance in legislative drafting, Ministry of Justice staff
development, and other similar activities.152 Although it may be prema-
ture to judge the effect of these various efforts, the fact remains that little
progress has been made in addressing the major challenges to the ad-
ministration of justice that I identified earlier.
But my main criticism is not with the level or efficacy of support for
the P.A. rendered at the technical level. Certainly, one could counsel -
and I do counsel - that more such support be provided given the enor-
mity of the challenges. But none of it is likely to be effective without
shifts in policy at the highest political levels, because at those levels, the
consistent message conveyed by American leaders to Palestinian leaders
is one of tolerance, if not actual encouragement of P.A. abuses, and an
indifference to the glacial pace of legal reform efforts. This has come
about as U.S. policy makers have repeatedly pressured the P.A. to act
decisively to quell anti-Israeli violence, virtually without regard to the
human and civil rights of Palestinians.
For example, in March, 1995, during a visit to Yasser Arafat in Jeri-
cho, Vice President Al Gore "warned that the P.A. must control Islamic
suicide bombers . . . ." and welcomed as "an important step forward" a
commitment by Arafat to set up the State Security Courts. 53 After
receiving Arafat's pledge of redoubled efforts to counter "terrorism," the
Vice President announced an accelerated U.S. aid program of $65 mil-
"51 See Rule of Law Development in the West Bank and Gaza Strip: Survey and Status
of the Development Effort, UNSCO, at 9 (1997).
152 See id. Annex One: Rule of Law Sector Support Table, at 31-40 (providing a de-
tailed list of recent legal reform activities along with their respective implementing or-
ganization, donor, and budget).
153 Clyde Haberman, In Jericho, Pledges of U.S. Aid and a Glimpse at Arafat, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 25, 1995, at A2.
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lion. 154 Later, on the eve of the first prosecutions in the State Security
Courts, Vice President Gore again praised the courts saying: "I know
there has been some controversy over the security courts. I personally
believe that the accusations are misplaced and that they [the Palestinians]
are doing the right thing and moving forward and that they must move
forward now with prosecutions.' 55
In April 1995, U.S. officials voiced approval of scores of arbitrary
arrests following two bombing attacks. State Department spokesperson
Christine Shelly said, "We expect the P.A. to take this type of concrete
action against those within its jurisdiction who seek to destroy the peace
process through acts of violence and terror."'' 56 At the same time, Presi-
dent Clinton was reported to have appealed to Palestinian authorities to
respond to attacks launched from areas under their jurisdiction with
"strict punishment.' ' 157
On August 5, 1997, Secretary of State Madeline Albright com-
mented that "[w]hat we would like is as robust a reaction to the terrorists
as [Arafat] took in March 1996, where he undertook a series of very spe-
cific steps to deal with the terrorist threat," a supposed reference to the
arrests and detention without charge of several hundred suspected
Islamists and the "abrupt closing" of a number of charitable societies af-
filiated with Hamas. 158 The relentless pressure on the P.A. to contain
"terrorism" continued through the run-up to the Wye River negotiations,
as President Clinton again reminded the Palestinian leadership of the
need to take all measures necessary to suppress attacks on Israelis. 159
It is not that U.S. policy leaders are ignorant of the abuses commit-
ted by the P.A. in their anxiety to measure up to U.S. andIsraeli de-
mands. The State Department's Country Reports on human rights have
reported such abuses annually since 1995.' The U.S. Central Intelli-
154 See Arafat Promises Crackdown on Terror, PLAIN DEALER, Mar. 25, 1995, at A15.
155 Gore Sees Palestinian Trials Starting Soon, REUTERS N. AM. WIRE, Apr. 5, 1995,
available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, REUNA File (providing the comments of Vice
President Gore made in a public conference held at the Washington Institute).
1M U.S. Endorses Arrests in Wake of Gaza Attack, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Apr. 10,
1995, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, AFPFR File.
"5 See id.
158 See The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process, Remarks and Q&A Session at the Na-
tional Press Club Washington, D.C., (Aug. 6, 1997) (remarks of Secretary of State Mafde-
leine K. Albright) (visited Mar. 1, 1999) <http:H/secretary.state.govlwww/statements/
970806.html>; H.R.W. WORLD REP. 1998, supra note 93, at 343.
159 See id.
160 See SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS & HOUSE COMM. ON INT'L RELATIONS,
104TH CONG.. COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUmAN RIGHTS PRACrICES FOR 1995 (Joint Comm.
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gence Agency has also been actively engaged in facilitating intelligence
transfers between Israeli and Palestinian security officials even before the
more public and formal role assigned to it in the Wye River agreement.
16
'
It simply strains credulity to think that the excesses of the P.A. have gone
unnoticed by American officials working in such intimate cooperation
with Palestinian officials.
To be fully accurate, U.S. officials have not always turned a blind
eye to P.A. excesses. There has been a markedly greater willingness to
criticize the P.A. when the context was one other than the direct battle
against anti-Israeli violence, such as the harassment or jailing of domes-
tic critics of the P.A. The United States publicly criticized the detention
of Palestinian-American television journalist Daoud Kuttab, who had
broadcasted sessions of the P.L.C. in which corruption on the P.A. had
been discussed,' 62 and intervened constructively in the previously men-
tioned case of Eyad Sarraj, the Commissioner General of P.I.C.C.R.' 1 In
February 1997, U.S. Consul in Jerusalem Edward Abington decried the
excessive numbers of Palestinian deaths in P.A. prisons, and stated
"[s]ecurity is important but it can't come at the cost of human rights."' 64
A welcome statement, to be sure. But if you were Yasser Arafat, recipi-
ent of these mixed signals from U.S. officials, to whom would you listen:
Edward Abington or Al Gore, with $65 million in aid to offer, Madeline
Albright, and President Clinton?
No one should question the right of Israelis to be free of violent at-
tack, nor the obligation of the P.A. to strive conscientiously to protect
that right. Yet Palestinians, too, are entitled to this right. They are enti-
tled to protection from the abuses of the Israeli military government,
where it continues to operate. They are entitled to protection from armed
Israeli settlers, who have often initiated attacks on or retaliated against
non-lethal attacks from Palestinians with lethal violence. And they are
entitled to protection from the abuses of the P.A. Ever solicitous of Is-
Print 1995); SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS & HOUSE COMM. ON INT'L RELA-
TIONS, 104TH CONG., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1996 (Joint
Comm. Print 1996); COUNTRY REPORTS 1997, supra note 100.
161 H.R.W./MIDDLE E. REP., supra note 33, at 41.
162 See H.R.W. WORLD REP. 1998, supra note 93, at 341, 343.
163 See H.R.W./MIDDLE E. REP., supra note 33, at 42. The arrest of Sarraj also stimu-
lated interest by the U.S. Congress in the excesses of the P.A., which led to hearings
before the House Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights of the
Committee on International Relations in July, 1996. See Human Rights Under the Pales-
tinian Authority: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Operations and Human Rights of
the House Comm. On Int'l Relations, 104th Cong. 1-3 (1996).
164 H.R.W. WORLD REP. 1998, supra note 93, at 343.
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raeli security, U.S. official statements have rarely focused on violations
of Palestinian security, or worse, they have endorsed them. This inconsis-
tency can hardly boost our claim to even-handedness in our oversight of
the peace process.
As Abigail Abrash of the R.F.K. Memorial Center for Human Rights
said:
Neither the findings from these U.S. [rule of law] assistance initiatives
nor the detailed accounts of human rights abuses and systematic prob-
lems contained in the U.S. State Departments country reports appear to
have informed U.S. policy. The U.S. government has not demonstrated
a credible human rights policy towards the region."
The time has come to rectify this inadequacy.
VIII. CONCLUSION
So what might we do differently? Here are two general, and three
more specific steps that can be taken to redress the problems in current
U.S. policy toward P.A. abuses of human and civil rights.
1. U.S. policy makers should consistently communicate that sup-
pression of violent opposition to Israel and the peace process cannot
come at the expense of Palestinian human and civil rights. The P.A.
must, as it has promised, abide by international standards and conven-
tions for the protection of human rights in its treatment of persons under
its jurisdiction. This message will really only be effective if it occurs at
the top leadership level, starting where it matters most - with the Presi-
dent of the United States - and ending, again, where it matters most -
with Yasser Arafat. This admonition is also likely not to be effective if it
is only one-sided - that is, if it is directed only at the P.A. and not si-
multaneously at the Israeli government, which has continued to commit
violations of Palestinians' human rights during the post-Oslo period.
2. Rule of law development programs for the P.A. should not
only receive further funding, but also feature more prominently in
policy discussions at the top leadership levels. Programs have already
been targeted to address the four major problem areas previously identi-
fied. What is now needed is a sense of urgency, an acknowledgment that
the success or failure of these efforts are not inconsequential to the peace
process, and a redoubling of efforts to overcome some of the obstacles to
the efficient administration of justice under the P.A.
These are the two general recommendations I would make. My
third, fourth, and fifth more specific recommendations build on the rec-
165 See Abrash Hearing, supra note 90, at 82-83.
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ognition that international vigilance may not be effective and, as a matter
of principle, should not be required to insure respect for human rights
under the P.A. Rather, the United States, together with the international
community, should nurture the development of an indigenous infrastruc-
ture that will ensure the vindication of basic rights for Palestinians. The
first and most fundamental task here is the building of a strong, inde-
pendent judiciary equipped with a body of law adequate to constrain
abuses of executive power. Thus, I recommend:
1. The United States should insist that the P.A. abolish the State
Security Courts, and offer new trials in regular courts to those pre-
viously convicted in the Security Courts system. The record shows that
trials in these courts have regularly fallen below minimum standards of
justice and the very existence of the courts imperils the integrity of the
judiciary as a whole. Military courts should be brought into conformity
with universal standards for fair trials and clear principles defining the
persons over whom military courts have jurisdiction must be elaborated.
2. U.S. policy makers should strongly urge that President Arafat
sign, and thus render effective, the Basic Law. The Basic Law en-
shrines fundamental principles of human and civil rights recognized and
voted on by elected representatives of the Palestinian community. Fur-
ther, the Basic Law provides guidance for police and government offi-
cials as to the legality of their conduct and offers local courts standards
by which to review claimed abuses of government authority. The Basic
Law also sets forth a legal referent for the relative powers of the three
branches of the Palestinian government, in the absence of which, the Pal-
estinian executive authority functions without check. No other law or
laws currently in place in the West Bank or Gaza Strip provide a substi-
tute for the Basic Law.
3. U.S. policy makers should strongly encourage the P.A. to pri-
oritize the passage of a comprehensive, coherent law for the judiciary
that lays the cornerstone for a truly independent third branch of
government. Most crucially, this law must establish a system of judicial
selection that ensures appointment to these pivotal offices solely on the
basis of merit, rather than political fealty. The version of the law already
passed by the P.L.C. is neither comprehensive, coherent, nor is there any
guarantee that it will be signed into law by Yasser Arafat. We cannot af-
ford to be indifferent to the fate of this absolutely critical piece of legisla-
tion - rather we should follow its progress closely and do everything
possible to see that the law accomplishes what it must to be effective.
It goes without saying that the mere passage of laws in and of them-
selves will not significantly alter circumstances on the ground. Indeed,
the P.A. has often demonstrated its readiness to act with little or no re-
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gard for law whatsoever. Real implementation and respect for the laws
passed must also be monitored and ensured.
More can and should be done. Yet these steps alone will give a tre-
mendous boost to the morale of those Palestinians, mainly in the P.L.C.,
who are trying to establish an accountable, law-abiding government. It
will also mean much to the Palestinian public, waiting, with fading
hopes, for some tangible benefit from the peace process.
I will not predict an apocalypse in the event we fail to do what I rec-
ommend. Perhaps it will all be unnecessary, and, at the end of the interim
period, we will all toast a new Middle East peace. Something tells me
that this is not likely, however, considering the arduousness of the nego-
tiations thus far over issues far less intractable than the ones that lie
ahead. I suspect, instead, that we are in for several more years of painful
work.
What I can say with confidence is that we will narrow our chances
of reaching that elusive goal of peace if, in the meantime, we do not ex-
ploit every avenue, including the one of legal reform, to broaden the con-
stituency for peace. As the principal overseer of the Middle East peace
process it is our responsibility to do this; as the pre-eminent power in the
world today, it is also our moral duty.
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